Neil D. Hone and Paula A. Hone v. ZZYZX Management Group, L.C., a Utah limited liability company, dba Chevy\u27s Fresh Mex, and Johndoes I though V: Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2003
Neil D. Hone and Paula A. Hone v. ZZYZX
Management Group, L.C., a Utah limited liability
company, dba Chevy's Fresh Mex, and Johndoes I
though V: Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Scott W. Christensen; Plant, Wallace, Christensen, Kanell; attorneys for appellee.
M. Dayle Jeffs; attorney for appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Hone v. ZZXYZ Management, No. 20030099 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2003).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4184
iiN irlE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
NEIL D. HONE and PAULA A. HONE, 
Plaintiffs/Appellant, 
ZZYZX MANAGEMENT GROUP, L.C., a 
Utah limited liability company, dba CHEVY'S 
FRESH MEX, and JOHNDOES I through V, 
Defendants/Appellee. Appeal No. 20030099-CA 
AIMMll I I S URII F 
Appeal from Decision of the Fourth District Court Utah County, State of Utah, 
The Honorable Judge Steven L. Hansen 
M.Dayle Jeffs, #1655 
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C. 
90 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 888 
Provo, UT 84603 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
SCOTT W. CHRISTENSEN, • © m 
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN 
& KANELL 
136 East South Temple, Suite i 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841 l l r - . 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Defendant/Appellee . ^ -
AUG 1 *» 2003 
Pauiette Stagg 
Clerk of the Court 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
NEIL D. HONE and PAULA A. HONE, 
Plaintiffs/Appellant, 
v. 
ZZYZX MANAGEMENT GROUP, L.C., a 
Utah limited liability company, dba CHEVY'S 
FRESH MEX, and JOHNDOES I through V, 
Defendants/Appellee. Appeal No. 20030099-CA 
APPELLEE'S BRIEF 
Appeal from Decision of the Fourth District Court Utah County, State of Utah, 
The Honorable Judge Steven L. Hansen 
M.Dayle Jeffs, #1655 
JOEFFS & JEFFS, P.C. 
90 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 888 
Provo, UT 84603 
SCOTT W. CHRISTENSEN, *<*H1 
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN 
&KANELL 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Plaintiff/Appellant Defendant/Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 4 
ARGUMENT 6 
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS APPROPRIATE BECAUSE THE HONES 
DID NOT PROVIDE EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT THE ALLEGED ROCKS 
WERE THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF NEIL'S FALL 6 
A. THE HONES HAVE NOT PRESENTED ANY EVIDENCE TO SHOW 
THAT ANY ROCKS WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN PRESENT WERE 
THE CAUSE OF NEIL'S FALL 6 
B. THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO WEIGH THE 
EVIDENCE TO GRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE 
HONES DID NOT PROVIDE EVIDENCE WITH RESPECT TO 
CAUSATION 10 
C. THE CASE LAW CITED BY THE HONES DOES NOT SUPPORT 
THE HONES CONTENTION OF SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
SUPPORT REASONABLE INFERENCES 10 
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS APPROPRIATE BECAUSE THE HONES 
FAILED TO SHOW THAT ZZXYZ BREACHED A DUTY OF CARE TO 
NEIL 20 
A. ZZXYZ HAS NOT CHOSEN A METHOD OF OPERATION WHERE 
IT IS REASONABLY FORESEEABLE THAT THE EXPECTABLE 
ACTS OF THIRD PARTIES WILL CREATE A DANGEROUS 
CONDITION 22 
i 
B. ZZXYZ'S ROCK LANDSCAPING IS NOT A PERMANENT 
STRUCTURE THAT WOULD CAUSE TEMPORARY 
HAZARDS 27 
CONCLUSION 28 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 29 
ADDENDUM 30 
i 
ii 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Case Law 
AUen v. Federated Dairy Farms. Inc.. 538 P.2d 175 (Utah 1975) 27 
Campbell v. Safewav Stores. Inc.. 388 P.2d 409 (Utah 1964) 14, 15,16,17 
Canfieldv.Albertsons.rnc. 841 P.2d 1224 (Utah App. 1992) 22,23, 24 
Dvbowski v. Ernest W. Hahn. Inc.. 775 P.2d 445 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 17,18 
Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Co.. 284 P.2d 477 (Utah 1955) 16,17,18 
Maugeri v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co.. 357 F.2d 202 (3rd Cir. 1996) 27 
Nelson, by and through Stuckman v. Salt Lake City, 
919 P.2d 568 (Utah 1996) 1,2,7,12,13,14 
Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets. 918 P.2d476 (Utah 1996) 26 
Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha Beta. Inc.. 814 P.2d 623 (Utah App. 1991) 11,12 
State v. Hester. 2000 UT App 159, 3 P.3d 725 7, 8 
Sumsion v. Streator-Smith. Inc., 132 P.2d 680 (Utah 1943) 7, 18, 19, 20 
State of Utah Constitutional Provisions 
Article VIII § 5 of the Utah Constitution 1 
State Statutes and Rules 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-3(2)0) 1 
Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 1 
iii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Article VIII § 5 of 
the Utah Constitution, Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) and (4), Utah Code Ann. § 78-2(a)-
3(2)(j), and Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The appeal is taken from the 
granting of a motion for summary judgment by the District Court, which was then appealed 
to the Utah Supreme Court. The case was transferred from the Utah Supreme Court to the 
Utah Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1) Did the district court err in granting summary judgment for ZZXYZ on the 
ground that Neil Hone failed to present evidence as to the cause of the fall and that further 
investigation would not reveal the cause of the fall, and therefore, causation could not be 
proven? 
2) Can the granting of summary judgment for ZZXYZ be upheld on the alternative 
ground that Neil Hone has failed to provide sufficient evidence to create a question of 
material fact regarding breach of duty to prevent a granting of summary judgment on that 
ground? 
The proper standard of review on both of these issues is a review for correctness. 
An appeal from a summary judgement only addresses two questions: "whether the lower 
court erred in (1) applying the governing law, and (2) holding that no material facts were in 
dispute." Nelson, by and through Stuckman v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah 
1996) (quoting Bushnell Real Estate, Inc. v. Nielson, 672 P.2d 746,749 (1983)). Thus, the 
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trial court's order of dismissal is reviewed for correctness. Id. (quoting St. Benedict's Dev. 
Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp.. 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991)). Also, "because negligence 
cases often require the drawing of inferences from the facts, which is properly done by 
juries rather than judges 'summary judgment is appropriate in negligence cases only in the 
clearest of instances.'" Id. (citing Dwiggins v. Morgan Jewlers, 811 P.2d 182,183 (Utah 
1991)). 
Both issues were preserved on appeal by being raised before the trial court. ZZXYZ 
argued in their original Memorandum In Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Plaintiff Neil D. Hone's Claims that Mr. Hone had failed to show that any alleged rocks 
were the proximate and actual cause of his injuries. (Chevy's Memorandum In Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment, pages 7-13; R. 135-141). This issue was further argued by 
ZZXYZ in Chevy's Reply In Further Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Plaintiff Neil D. Hone's Claims. (Chevy's Reply In Further Support of Its Motion for 
Summary Judgment on Plaintiff Neil D. Hone's Claims, pages 2-6; R. 235-240). 
Also in their original Memorandum In Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Plaintiff Neil D. Hone's Claims, ZZXYZ argued that the Hones had failed to make a prima 
facie case for negligence because the Hones had not supplied evidence as to the length of 
time the dangerous condition had existed, in order to show constructive knowledge on the 
part of ZZXYZ. (Chevy's Memorandum In Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, 
pages 13-14; R. 134-135). The issue of breach was argued extensively at the first oral 
arguement, and was the main focus of the supplemental proceeding hearing on the summary 
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judgment motion. (Transcript of the supplemental proceeding is attached as Exhibit 1 of 
the Addendum.) The issue was briefed in the Supplemental Memorandum In Support of 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, pages 3 and 4 (R. 276-277) filed by ZZXYZ; 
and the Supplemental Memorandum In Response to Plaintiffs' Memorandum In Opposition 
to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, pages 4 and 5 (R. 325-326). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is essentially a "slip and fall" case involving Mr. Neil Hone and ZZXYZ 
Management Group d.b.a. Chevy's Fresh Mex. Mr. Hone alleges that ZZXYZ's negligent 
maintenance of its landscaping and sidewalk resulted in Mr. Hone slipping and falling on 
rocks located on ZZXYZ's sidewalk. The trial court granted summary judgment on the 
ground that Mr. Hone had failed to provide any evidence that would show that any rocks 
which might have been on ZZXYZ's sidewalk were the proximate cause of Mr. Hone's fall. 
(R. 340). Mr. Hone appealed to the Utah Supreme Court who transferred the case to this 
Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
For the purposes of reviewing the granting of summary judgment by the trial court, 
ZZXYZ does not dispute the majority of the description of the facts provided by the Hones 
in their brief. ZZXYZ does not stipulate to these facts, but instead acknowledges that for 
the purposes of summary judgment all questions of fact are to be viewed in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party. 
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Specifically, only for the purposes of summary judgment does ZZXYZ assume that 
there were rocks on the sidewalk at the time of Mr. Hone's fall. At trial, ZZXYZ would 
contend that there were not any rocks on the sidewalk, as stated by Sarah Howard in her 
deposition. (Sarah Howard's Deposition, page 14, line 2 to page 15, line 20; R. 119). 
ZZXYZ does not agree with the Hones' characterization of Mr. Ryan McMillan's 
deposition testimony to the extent that it might suggest that Mr. McMillan states that he did 
not conduct an examination of the sidewalk at the beginning of his shift on the day in 
question. Mr. McMillan was specifically asked whether he recalled policing the area 
outside on the day in question, to which he responded "[t]hat morning I don't recall." (Ryan 
McMillan's Deposition, page 12 lines 12-16; R. 110). This testimony at best simply shows 
that Mr. McMillan cannot remember whether or not he policed the outside area on that 
particular day, and does not support a contention or an inference that the policing was not 
done. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Summary judgment was appropriate because the Hones did not provide evidence 
with respect to the proximate cause of Neil's fall. The Hones only evidence is that Neil 
thought he slipped on something, that Paula thought it looked like he stumbled, and Paula 
and Dustin claim to have seen rocks in the vicinity. These statements are insufficient 
evidence to allow a fact finder to make reasonable inferences that Neil stepped on a rock 
and that the rock came from the rock landscaping. Any such findings would have to be the 
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result of speculation because there is no direct evidence to support a finding that Neil in 
fact stepped on a rock or that the rock would have come from the landscaping. 
The Hones also did not supply evidence to support a finding that ZZXYZ breached a 
duty of care to Neil. With respect to a theory involving a method of operation, a 
landscaping choice is not a method of operation of the business. Landscaping should not be 
considered the way in which a business is operated. Even if landscaping were considered to 
be a method of operation, removal of rocks from landscaping is not an expected act within 
the theory. Accordingly, any danger presented by rocks from the landscaping being on the 
sidewalk do not fall within the category of a reasonably foreseeable inherent danger. With 
respect to the landscaping being a permanent structure causing temporary hazards, there is 
no evidence which would support a finding that absent some unexpected act, the rocks from 
the landscaping would move to the sidewalk. Only the intervention of a third-party could 
move the rocks to the sidewalk. 
Accordingly, any rocks which were allegedly on the sidewalk should properly be 
treated as a temporary condition. This requires that the Hones supply evidence to show that 
ZZXYZ either knew or should have known of the rocks presence. The Hones have not 
shown that ZZXYZ had actual knowledge of the rocks, nor have the Hones supplied any 
evidence with respect to the length of time the rocks were on the sidewalk. The Hones have 
tried to claim that ZZXYZ's manager on duty at the time failed to make a required 
inspection. However, the only testimony on this point is that the manager does not 
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remember whether or not he made the inspection that day. Accordingly, it would only be a 
matter of speculation by the fact finder as to whether the inspection was made. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Summary Judgment Was Appropriate Because the Hones Did Not Provide 
Evidence Showing That the Alleged Rocks Were the Proximate Cause of 
Neil's Fall 
The trial court ruled that "[n]o evidence has been presented that the rocks were the 
cause of the fall, simply a 'bare contention' made that they could be the cause." 
(Memorandum Decision of Trial Court, Appellant's Brief Exhibit "J"; R.342). The trial 
court further concluded that "further investigation will not reveal the cause of the fall and 
thus the claim fails as a matter of law." (Id.; R. 342). The trial court did find that there was 
a material issue of fact with respect to whether or not Chevy's knew or should have known 
that the rocks were on the sidewalk and an unsafe condition existed. (Memorandum 
Decision; R. 341). A review of the record indicates that there is no evidence that would 
support a finding that Chevy's breached a duty of care to Neil. 
A. The Hones Have Not Presented Any Evidence to Show That Any Rocks 
Which May Have Been Present Were the Cause of NeiPs Fall. 
The trial court correctly held that there was no evidence to show that rocks which 
may or may not have been present in the vicinity of Neil's fall were the proximate and 
actual cause of Neil's fall and the resulting injuries. Before the trial court, the Hones 
presented the following statements by affidavit or deposition testimony. Paula states that 
she saw small rocks in the area where Neil fell. (Paula's Deposition, page 15, line 14 to 
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page 16, line 8; R. 104-103). Dustin states that while in the area of the accident, apparently 
after Neil's fall, he observed what appeared to be pea gravel in the area where Neil fell. 
(Dustin's Affidavit, page 2, ^  9; R. 284). Paula states that she saw Neil fall like 'lie had 
stumbled on something." (Paula's Deposition, page 12, lines 2-4; R. 104). Neil himself 
stated in his deposition that he remembered his right foot slipping and that it "felt like there 
was something ... [under his right foot]". (Neil's Deposition, page 27, lines 6-17; R. 126). 
Even if these statements are proven to be true and accurate, all the statements establish is 
that Neil slipped and fell in the vicinity of some loose gravel. These statements do not 
prove necessary links in the chain of causation such as (1) that Neil actually stepped on 
something; (2) that the item that Neil stepped on was a rock; and (3) the rock caused Neil to 
slip. 
The Hones argue that a jury is entitled to make reasonable inferences from the 
evidence presented, and that Utah law allows each of the links in the chain of causation to 
be proven by inference. Sumsion v. Streator-Smith, Inc., 132 P.2d 680, 682 (Utah 1943). 
What Utah law does not allow is for fact finders to speculate about issues of causation. 
Nelson By and Through Stuckman v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 574 (Utah 1996). The 
Hones contend that the statements of Neil, Paula, and Dustin are sufficient evidence so that 
a finding by a fact finder that the rocks did cause the fall would be a reasonable inference. 
The Hones correctly state that "inference" and "speculation" have been specifically 
defined. (Hones' Appellant Brief, page 24). An "inference" has been defined in Utah as "a 
deduction as to the existence of a fact which human experience teaches us can reasonably 
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and logically be drawn from proof of other facts." State v. Hester. 2000 UT App 159, f 16, 
3 P.3d 725 (quoting Manchester v. Dugan. 247 A.2d 827,829 (Me. 1968)). "Speculation" 
is defined as the "act or practice of theorizing about matters over which there is no certain 
knowledge." Id. (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1407 (7th ed. 1999)). The Court of 
Appeals correctly notes that speculation and inference are simply two points on a 
continuum between absolute certainty and complete impossibiUty. Id. However, this is not 
to say that there are not situations where the difference is readily apparent. 
In the instant case, the Hones argue that a jury could reasonably infer the necessary 
links in the chain of causation from the Hones allegations that there were rocks on the 
ground near the location of Neil's fall, that Neil's fall looked like he stumbled on 
something, and that Neil felt something under his foot. Assuming for the purposes of 
argument that Neil did step on something and that there were rocks in the vicinity of Neil's 
fall, this evidence would not support reasonable inferences with respect to the necessary 
links in causation. . , 
The first link in the chain of causation is that Neil stepped on something. To support 
this, the Hones have provided Neil's statement that he felt something under his foot. It 
would appear that a finder of fact could reasonably infer that there was something under his 
foot. Human experience could easily tell a fact finder that when it feels like there is 
something under your foot there usually is. < 
The second link is that the "something" under Neil's foot was a rock. While the 
Hones appear to argue that it is a reasonable inference that if you feel something under 
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your foot and there are small rocks nearby, that a fact finder is reasonably entitled to infer 
that it was a rock that was under your foot. However, a careful reading of the definition of 
inference show that such a finding would be speculation. An inference is a deduction that 
human experience teaches can be reasonably and logically drawn from proof of other facts. 
The presence of other rocks in the vicinity does not support a logical finding that if 
someone steps on something in the vicinity of rocks that it is a rock that the person has 
stepped on. It suggests the possibility of it being a rock that was stepped on, but there is no 
certain knowledge. Instead, such a finding would fit the definition of speculation as 
theorizing about matters over which there is no certain knowledge. 
The third link is that assuming Neil stepped on a rock, the rock caused Neil to slip. 
Assuming for the moment that it was proven that Neil stepped on a rock, it would appear 
that a fact finder would be entitled to infer that stepping on the rock caused Neil's foot to 
slip resulting in the fall. However, this legitimate inference only serves to show the 
difference between an legitimate inference and speculation. 
Human experience teaches that if you step on a small rock on concrete the rock can 
skid, causing you to slip and possibly fall. Human experience does not teach that if you 
step on something and there are rocks nearby, you must have stepped on a rock. All that is 
shown is a mere possibility. Under such a theory, attempting to identify the item that was 
stepped on by looking at the surrounding area is pure speculation. It is equally possible that 
Neil stepped on a mint dropped by a patron leaving the restaurant, or that Neil stepped on a 
marble dropped by a child. While the Hones would undoubtably respond that there is no 
9 
evidence of a mint, a marble, or any other item on the sidewalk; there is no evidence that 
there was a rock underneath Neil's foot. Proximity does not equal probability. 
B. The Trial Court Was Not Required to Weigh the Evidence to Grant 
Summary Judgment Because the Hones Did Not Provide Evidence With 
Respect to Causation. 
The Hones argue that because Paula concluded that the rocks were the cause of 
Neil's fall, the only way that the trial court could have granted summary judgment was to 
find that this "evidence" was disregarded or deemed not credible. (Hones' Appellant Brief, 
page 38). The Hones beheve that this statement constitutes a fact which when taken in the 
light most favorable to the Hones should preclude summary judgment. However, the trial 
court correctly identified this statement as a 'bare contention' as to the cause of Neil's fall. 
Paula's belief is based on her observations that her husband appeared to stumble and that 
after his fall she saw rocks nearby. (Paula's Deposition, page 15, lines 14-18; R. 106). 
Paula has no direct knowledge of what caused Neil's fall. Accordingly, there was no 
"evidence" for the trial court to weigh. Paula's belief is not evidence, only her direct 
observations. Paula is not entitled to make inferences or speculate and then have such 
inferences or speculation treated as fact. 
C The Case Law Cited by the Hones Does Not Support the Hones 
Contention of Sufficient Evidence to Support Reasonable Inferences, 
The Hones have cited a number of cases which they claim support their proposition 
that they have provided sufficient evidence on which a finder of fact could reasonably infer 
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the necessary links in the chain of causation. However, a careful review of these cases 
shows that the cases do not support the Hones contention. 
The Hones cite the case of Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P.2d 623 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991) for the proposition that inferential evidence can be obtained primarily from a 
witness, and that the evidence does not have to be observed prior to the accident. (Hones' 
Appellant Brief, page 25). In that case, after observing the fall of her friend, the witness 
went to help her friend up and discovered the floor was wet. Silcox at 624. Neither the 
plaintiff nor the witness had noticed that the floor was wet prior to the fall. Id. After the 
plaintiff had been removed from the area, the friend noticed that there were spots of water 
leading from the wet area where the plaintiff fell to a cart used to transport stock items, 
which was loaded with bags of melting ice, located approximately 115 feet away. Id. The 
Court of Appeals held that u[a]n inference could readily be drawn by the jury that the water 
in which plaintiff fell came from the bags of ice on the cart left in the aisle by store 
employees." Id. at 624-25. 
Silcox is factually distinguishable from the instant case. In Silcox, it was not 
contested that the water on the floor caused the plaintiffs fall. Silcox was before the Court 
of Appeals on the question of whether or not the store's employees caused the dangerous 
condition, which would avoid the need to prove notice to the store. Id. at 624. The 
inferences that a fact finder would have been entitled to reasonably make were with respect 
to how the water got onto the floor of the dry goods aisle. The witness noticed that the 
floor was wet where the plaintiff fell. The witness observed puddles of water leading from 
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the wet spot to the cart 115 feet away. The witness observed that the cart was loaded with 
bags of melting ice. Observations made after a fall in this situation could support 
reasonable inferences as to how the water got onto the floor. The Court of Appeals did not 
examine the issue of whether such observations would entitle the plaintiff to an inference 
that the water had caused the plaintiffs fall. 
The Hones again cite to the case of Nelson By and Through Stuckman, supra, this 
time for the proposition that the existence of alternative theories of causation does not 
preclude presenting evidence to the jury and also provides a model for acceptable 
inferences. (Hones' Appellant Brief, page 27). Nelson involves a four year-old boy who 
wandered out of a park and into the Jordan River where he was injured. The boy's mother 
sued Salt Lake City and the State of Utah for failure to repair a breach in the fence, 
claiming that the boy must have reached the river through the breach in the fence. 
Defendants claimed that the boy could have climbed the four-foot fence or gained access 
through some other means. The facts of the case indicate there were no witnesses who saw 
the boy pass through the breach in the fence. The case was decided by the trial court by 
finding that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act precluded liability, that in the absence of 
the Act, the Jordan River is a natural waterway for which the City is not responsible, that the 
Landowner Liability Act required ''willful" or "malicious" action, and that the claims did not 
come within the time limitations prescribed by the Governmental Immunity Act. Id. at 571. 
The Court never made any factual conclusions with respect to how the boy reached the 
river. Id. at 574. 
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The Court does state that "[although there no witnesses, other evidence may be 
sufficient for a jury to find that it was 'more likely than not' that Nelson entered through 
the breach in the fence." Id. at 574. The Hones characterize this statement by the Supreme 
Court as the Court having "decided that even though the boy could have climbed the four-
foot fence or gained access to the river by some other opening there was enough 'other 
evidence5 that a jury could reasonably conclude that more likely than not the boy entered 
the river through the breach." (Hones' Appellant Brief, page 28). The statement in the 
Hones' Brief is an incorrect reading of the Court's decision. The Court stated that "other 
evidence may be sufficient [to support a jury finding] that it was 'more likely than not' that 
Nelson entered through the breach in the fence." Id. at 574. (Emphasis added). This does 
not mean that the Court found that there was sufficient evidence to support an inference, 
rather the Court simply recognized that a lack of witnesses does not automatically preclude 
submitting the issue to a fact finder provided there is "other evidence" which was sufficient 
to support a reasonable inference. This is particularly true where the trial court's decision 
was not based on the elements of a negligence claim, but rather on grounds of immunity and 
the claims being time barred. 
In the instant matter, there are no witnesses with respect to what, if anything, Neil 
stepped on. While the Nelson decision would allow a jury to rely on "other evidence" 
which would support a reasonable inference that Neil stepped on a rock, the Hones have not 
been able to provide any such evidence. The fact that there were rocks nearby will not 
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support a reasonable inference, only speculation. Paula's statement that she believed the 
rocks caused the fall is based on her own speculation and is likewise not "other evidence". 
The Hones have not provided any "other evidence" to support an inference that a 
rock caused Neil's fall. Accordingly, as the Nelson court stated, "[a] mere possibility of 
such causation is not enough; and when the matter remains one of pure speculation or 
conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court 
to direct a verdict for the defendant." Nelson at 574 (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., 
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 41, at 265 (5th ed. 1984), quoted in Weber v. 
Springville Citv, 725 P.2d 1360,1367 (Utah 1986)). 
The Hones next case is Campbell v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 388 P.2d 409 (Utah 1964) 
for the proposition that it is a reasonable inference if a jury could "conclude that there was 
a greater possibility that the canned goods box was left in the aisle by an employee rather 
than a customer." (Hones'Appellant Brief, page 28). In Campbell, the plaintiff at a 
grocery store tripped over an empty cardboard box. Id. at 409. There was no question as to 
what caused the fall, instead the case turned on how the box in question came to be on the 
floor of the aisle where the plaintiff tripped. The Court found that as the result of a number 
of facts regarding the box itself and the customary usage of boxes in the store that a jury 
could reasonably conclude that there was "a greater probability that store employees left 
the box where it was than that a customer or stranger did." Id. at 411. It should be noted 
that while the Campbell Court talked about "greater probability," the Hones would cite the 
rule as "greater possibility." (Emphasis added). 
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Among the facts which the Campbell Court found would support a jury's finding 
were that the box was of a type that some of the canned goods sold at the store came in 
which the clerks then stock on the shelves; that it would be unusual for a customer to be 
using a cardboard box in the merchandise area; especially given the small size of the box; 
that customers usually use shopping carts as opposed to boxes in doing their shopping; that 
the checkers usually place purchased items in large sacks although in some instances 
boxes; and that if boxes are used by the checkers they are usually larger than the box in this 
case. Id. at 410. 
In Campbell, the jury was attempting to determine how the box came to be in the 
aisle of the store. The jury was not trying to determine what had caused the plaintiff to fall. 
This is very different from the current matter where the Hones are not asking a fact finder 
to infer how an item came to be on the sidewalk, but are rather asking the jury to infer the 
existence of an item; then infer the identity of this item whose existence has been inferred; 
and then infer the source of this item, whose identity and existence are based on inference. 
The Hones cannot simply cite the Campbell decision for the proposition that a proper 
inference is any where a jury could reasonably conclude that there was a greater possibility 
that a store employee left the box and from there try to say that any possibility that is 
greater than the others presented is a reasonable inference. 
While not explicit in the Campbell case, a careful reading supports the idea that the 
Court was really advancing a "more likely than not standard". In other words, the Court was 
saying that it was more likely that a store employee left the box on the floor than the 
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combined likelihood that the box arrived on the floor from any other source. This idea is 
supported by the Court's use of the "customer or stranger" language. By grouping 
"customer" and "stranger" together the Court was saying that in comparing the probability 
that an employee had left the box as opposed to the combined probability of a customer or 
some other person having left the box, a jury could reasonably believe that the probability 
of an employee having left the box was greater than the combined probabiUty of a customer 
or stranger. 
Under a proper reading of the Campbell case, the Hones argument would have to be 
that based on the "evidence" presented, that it would be reasonable for a jury to conclude 
that it was more likely that Neil stepped on a rock than the combined likelihood of Neil 
having stepped on any other item. There is no evidence to support such a finding by a fact 
finder. The only evidence provided is that Neil apparently slipped on something and after 
the fall, rocks were seen nearby. Any attempt to say that it was in fact a rock that Neil 
stepped on is pure speculation. And even if it is more likely that it was a rock, under the 
Hones' theory of a permanent condition, it would also have to be shown that the rock came 
from the landscaping. In this case, no one knows what, if anything, Neil slipped on and 
there is no way to connect this speculative item with Chevy's. 
The Campbell Court compared their case with the case of Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel 
Co., 284 P.2d 477 (Utah 1955), which is also cited by the Hones as a benchmark for 
speculation. (Hones Brief at 29). In Lindsay, the plaintiff slipped in a puddle of water on 
the floor of a restaurant. Id. at 478. However, the plaintiff did not provide any evidence as 
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to how the water had arrived on the floor or how long it had been there. Id. Under these 
circumstances, the Court held that "a jury cannot be permitted to speculate that the 
defendant was negligent." Id. 
This Lindsay decision is based on facts which are actually better for a plaintiff than 
the current situation. In Lindsay, the cause of the accident was known, it was the puddle of 
water. However, absent evidence that would link the puddle of water to either actions of the 
restaurant's employees or evidence that the water had been there for a sufficient period of 
time so that the restaurant knew or should have known of the water's presence, it was 
improper to allow a jury to speculate. Id. at 478. The Hones have not yet been able to show 
what the item which caused Neil's fall was, let alone that ZZXYZ is liable for the item's 
presence. Even if it would be proper to infer that Neil did slip on a rock, there is nothing to 
connect this rock to ZZXYZ's rock landscaping. The "inferred" rock would be featureless, 
much like the water in Lindsay, without any of the specific facts present in the Campbell 
case which linked the box to the store and its employees. The Hones have couched their 
claim under a theory of a permanent dangerous condition in the rock landscaping. 
Accordingly, they must show that the "inferred" rock that caused Neil's fall came from the 
landscaping. There is nothing which would connect a rock whose presence is inferred to 
the rock landscaping in question. 
The Hones also cite to the case of Dvbowski v. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc., 775 P.2d 445 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) for a reference point with respect to speculation. In Dvbowski, the 
plaintiff slipped and fell as she entered a mall. Id. at 445. The plaintiff did not know what 
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caused her to fall and the plaintiff was unaware of any condition on the floor that might have 
caused her to fall. Id. at 447. The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff had failed to raise 
any material issue of fact beyond a "bare contention" that the defendant was somehow 
negligent and accordingly summary judgment was proper. Id. 
The Hones case would appear to fall somewhere between the Dvbowski decision and 
the Lindsay decision on the "continuum" of speculation and inference. In Dvbowski, there 
was absolutely no evidence provided which would show that the defendant was in any way 
negligent. In Lindsay, while there was water on the floor which caused the plaintiffs fall, 
there was no evidence to explain how the water got onto the floor and if the defendant was 
responsible for the water being on the floor or if the defendant had sufficient time to 
become aware of the water. In the case before this Court, for the purposes of summary 
judgment it is assumed that there were rocks on the sidewalk. However, the Hones have not 
provided evidence that these rocks caused Neil's fall or that the rocks themselves either 
came from the landscaping or that the rocks had been on the sidewalk for long enough that 
ZZXYZ should have known of the rock's presence. Since the factual situation in this case 
is effectively "bracketed" by two cases where Utah courts have found that any findings 
would have to be based on speculation, any findings in the instant matter would also have to 
be speculative. 
Finally, the Hones refer again to the Sumsion decision as a reference to when 
evidence is speculative. In Sumsion, the plaintiff claimed that the tow-truck driver towing 
the plaintiffs vehicle failed to signal with his arm before entering the flow of traffic. Id. at 
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682. The plaintiffs vehicle was struck by another vehicle as it was towed into traffic. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court held that while there was sufficient evidence to go to a jury with 
respect to whether the driver failed to signal based on the witness testimony of the plaintiff 
and his wife who were riding in the tow-truck at the time, the "evidence relating to the issue 
of proximate cause is ... very meager." Id. Accordingly, the Court found that the trial court 
correctly held that the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case for recovery in 
negligence. Id. at 683. 
The Hones claim that the instant case is distinguishable from Sumsion. In Sumsion,, 
the Court noted that while the only witness "may have noticed what caused [the vehicle 
which struck the plaintiffs vehicle to] start to skid ... [the witness] was not questioned on 
[this] point." Id. at 682. The Hones characterize this statement as "the witness was never 
questioned as to what he thought the cause of the skid was[.]" (Hones' Appellant Brief, 
page 31). Later, the Hones rely on their characterization of the Court's statement that the 
witness was not asked what he thought caused the accident to support their contention that 
Paula's belief that the rocks caused Neil's fall is substantial evidence of causation. (Hones' 
Appellant Brief, page 38). 
This argument misinterprets the Court's statement and misapplies the correct rule. 
The Court's statement is that the witness "may have noticed what caused [the skid]." 
Sumsion at 682. The Court's statement is referring to direct observation by the witness, 
not a belief based on speculation. The Court's statement is also clarified by an example the 
Court gave with respect to proper inferences based on observations. The Court stated that 
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"where a car, apparently turning too sharply, skids, a witness may conclude that the skidding 
was caused by the sharp turning. However, if it is later shown that the brakes on one wheel 
had locked, the natural inference that the turning caused the skidding may be upset." Id. 
In other words, the Court recognized that if a witness could be asked if they saw 
something which the witness believes caused the skid, for example a sharp turn, or in the 
case of a slip and fall, that the person stepped on a rock. The Hones claim that Paula's 
statement should be given the same weight because her belief is also based on her 
observations. However, Paula did not see what Neil stepped on. She noticed that he 
seemed to stumble, and after the fall she saw some rocks nearby. Paula did not make the 
kinds of direct observations necessary for her belief to be considered evidence. In order 
for Paula's testimony to be considered evidence with respect to causation, she would have 
had to see Neil actually step on the rock. In that case, she could properly testify that she 
believed the rock to be the cause of the fall because she saw Neil step on a rock and then 
fall. 
II. Summary Judgment Was Appropriate Because the Hones Failed to Show That 
ZZXYZ Breached a Duty of Care to Neil. 
Summary Judgment would also have been appropriate and can be affirmed by this 
Court on the grounds that the Hones have failed to show that ZZXYZ breached a duty of 
care to Neil. Before the trial court, the Hones argued that the breach of duty on the part of 
ZZXYZ was that there were rocks in the landscaping near the sidewalk, that some of the 
rocks from the landscaping got onto the sidewalk, and that ZZXYZ did not take care of the 
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rocks on the sidewalk. ("Exhibit 1" Transcript of Oral Argument on Motion for Summary 
Judgment on October 29, 2002, page 24, lines 10 to 15). The Hones further argued that 
they do not have to prove how the rocks were moved from the landscaping to the sidewalk. 
("Exhibit 1" Transcript of Oral Argument on Motion for Summary Judgment on October 29, 
2002, page 24, lines 15 to 18). Counsel for the Hones stated that the Hones "have to prove 
that there were rocks on the [the sidewalk] and that the [rocks on the sidewalk] was an 
unsafe condition at the time Neil Hone fell and let the jury draw their inferences because ... 
it is an impossible burden to say precisely how this rock was picked up or those (sic) group 
of rocks were picked up and put over on the sidewalk." ("Exhibit 1" Transcript of Oral 
Argument on Motion for Summary Judgment On October 29,2002, page 24, lines 18 to 
24). 
The Hones argument fails to understand the required elements that must be shown to 
support a claim of breach of duty. The Hones allege that they are only required to show that 
a dangerous condition existed at the time of Neil Hone's fall to prove a breach of duty. The 
Hones further allege that ZZXYZ created this dangerous condition by placing rock 
landscaping next to the sidewalk. However, it is not enough to simply say that ZZXYZ 
placed rocks near the sidewalk and some of these rocks somehow ended up on the sidewalk, 
so ZZXYZ is responsible. 
The Hones' argument is exactly the same as the common situation of produce in a 
stand in a supermarket, where an individual slips and falls on produce that arguably came 
from the stand. The plaintiff in such cases has the duty to either show there was some 
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defect in the produce stand itself such that produce would fall by itself to the floor, or that 
the produce had been on the floor for sufficient time that the store should have discovered 
the condition and remedied the condition. The Hones have not and cannot provide any 
evidence as to how long the alleged gravel would have been on the sidewalk, so they must 
instead rely on theories involving permanent conditions which do not require notice to the 
defendant. 
The Hones appear to present two separate theories of permanent hazard on appeal. 
First, that ZZXYZ's use of rock landscaping was somehow a method of operation where it 
was reasonably foreseeable that the expectable acts of third parties will create a dangerous 
condition; and second, that temporary hazards are treated as permanent hazards if they are 
caused by a permanent structure. However, permanent condition theories still do not allow 
a plaintiff to simply allege that rocks were placed near a sidewalk, that such rocks somehow 
got onto the sidewalk which created a dangerous condition at the time of the accident. To 
do so would be to hold that anyone who installs gravel landscaping is strictly liable for 
anyone who slips and falls on a rock near such landscaping. 
A. ZZXYZ Has Not Chosen a Method of Operation Where It Is Reasonably 
Foreseeable That the Expectable Acts of Third Parties Will Create a 
Dangerous Condition. 
In Canfield v. Albertsons, Inc., 841 P.2d 1224 (Utah App. 1992), the Court of 
Appeals held that where a store had adopted a method of operation where it was reasonably 
foreseeable that the expectable acts of third parties will create a dangerous condition or 
defect, the plaintiff does not need to establish notice to the defendant. This is important 
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because the Hones have not presented any evidence that the rocks that were allegedly 
present would have been there for any length of time sufficient for ZZXYZ to become 
aware of the rocks and to have had sufficient time to remove the rocks. It is somewhat 
curious that the Hones would now rely on a theory regarding the expectable acts of third 
parties, given that the Hones at the trial court argued that, "[w]e have never, ever suggested 
that a third person put those rocks there." ("Exhibit 1" Transcript of Oral Argument on 
Motion for Summary Judgment on October 29,2002, page 23, lines 24 and 25). 
Canfield involved a supermarket that had chosen to use a display of "farmer's pack" 
lettuce, in which the store intended customers to remove some of the outer leaves of the 
lettuce. Indeed, the store had provided empty boxes around the display in which the 
customers could deposit these outer leaves. The Court of Appeals stated that, viewing the 
facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff: 
Albertsons chose a method of displaying and offering lettuce fore sale where 
it was expected that third parties would remove and discard the outer leaves 
from heads of lettuce they intended to purchase. It was reasonably 
foreseeable that under this method of operation some leaves would fall or be 
dropped on the floor by customers thereby creating a dangerous condition. 
Because Albertsons chose this method of operation, the question of whether 
Albertsons had notice, either actual or constructive, is not relevant. The 
relevant question is whether Albertsons took reasonable precautions to 
protect customers against the dangerous condition it created. 
The Hones now try to contend that ZZXYZ has chosen a method of operation where it is 
reasonably foreseeable that the expectable acts of third parties will create a dangerous 
condition. 
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The rule outlined in Canfield does not fit the facts in the current situation. First, 
ZZXYZ's choice in landscaping cannot be considered to be a method of operation. The 
phrase "method of operation" appears to refer to the manner in which an entity conducts its 
business. For example, in Canfield, Albertsons expected customers to remove the outer 
leaves of the lettuce and had provided means for disposing of those outer leaves. While 
there was an intervening actor, the customer, Albertsons not only expected, but encouraged 
customers to act the way they did. Accordingly, where Albertsons expected and 
encouraged customers to remove outer lettuce leaves and through them into empty boxes it 
became reasonably foreseeable that some leaves would end up on the floor, and it became 
Albertsons duty to take reasonable precautions to prevent such accidents. 
Landscaping is not a method of operation. The landscaping has nothing to do with 
the way in which ZZXYZ conducts its business. ZZXYZ does not intend for its customers 
to interact with the landscaping. Indeed, the use of large rocks should encourage customers 
to avoid the landscaping, since it would be much more difficult than merely walking on the 
sidewalk. There has been no suggestion that the landscaping was placed in such a way as to 
encourage customers or others to walk through the landscaping as opposed to walking on 
the sidewalk. 
Second, it is not the expected act of a customer or other person to remove the rocks 
from the landscaping and deposit the rocks on the sidewalk. There is no reason for a person 
to move rocks to the sidewalk from the landscaping. In Canfield, the act of removing 
lettuce leaves was expected because it was what Albertsons wanted the customer to do. 
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There is no reason for ZZXYZ to want customers or others to remove rocks from the 
landscaping. ZZXYZ did nothing to encourage customers or others to remove rocks from 
the landscaping. ZZXYZ cannot be said to have expected rocks to have been removed from 
the landscaping and deposited on the sidewalk. 
Third, as it was not an expectable act of third parties to remove rocks from the 
landscaping and drop them on the sidewalk, it cannot now be claimed that it was reasonably 
foreseeable that an expectable act would create a dangerous condition. To hold otherwise 
would effectively mean that anyone who utilizes rock landscaping is liable to anyone who 
falls on a rock near the landscaping in question. This is particularly true where even if Neil 
did slip on a rock, there is nothing to connect the rock to the landscaping other than the 
vicinity. 
The Hones also try to claim that an inherent danger was established by failing to 
inspect the sidewalks for items such as rocks that might create a danger since ZZXYZ was 
aware that there might be things which might be of harm on the sidewalk. (Hones Brief at 
21). An inherent danger cannot be established by a failure to inspect. ZZXYZ was aware 
that items on the sidewalk could constitute a danger and had a policy of managers 
inspecting the sidewalks as they came on shift. This inspection is meant to reveal existing 
dangerous conditions. Any failure to inspect would not create the condition or somehow 
cause the condition to become more dangerous, because the condition would have either 
existed at the time of the inspection or not have existed. A failure to inspect does not 
suddenly cause dangerous conditions to be created. 
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The Hones rely on the statement by Ryan McMillan, the manager on duty at the time 
of the accident, that he does not remember whether or not he performed the customary 
inspection of the premises, including the sidewalk, on the day of the accident. (Hones 
Brief at 21). This does not show that ZZXYZ failed to make the inspection, only that Mr. 
McMillan does not remember years later at the time of his deposition, whether or not he 
performed the inspection that day. (McMillan's Deposition, page 12, lines 12-16; R. 110). 
Assuming for the moment that Neil did slip on a rock and that the rock did come 
from the rock landscaping, this case is much more like the temporary condition cases 
where someone slips on an item that has fallen to the floor by the unexpected act of 
another. In Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets. 918 P.2d 476 (Utah 1996), the Utah 
Supreme Court dealt with the method of operation theory in the context of a slip and fall in 
the deli section of a store. The plaintiff in Schnuphase claimed that it was expected that 
customers eat ice cream in the store's deli section and it was foreseeable that ice cream 
would fall to the floor causing a danger of slipping and falling. Id. at 479. The Court held 
that the plaintiff failed to provide evidence of the foreseeabihty of an inherently dangerous 
condition. Id. Essentially, the court held there was nothing inherently dangerous in the way 
the store was conducting its deli business. 
Comparing Schnuphase to the instant case shows that while it is possible that rocks 
from the landscaping might on occasion end up on the sidewalk, these incidents are 
properly treated as temporary conditions. It is not expected that third parties would place 
rocks on the sidewalk. It is not expected that third parties would walk through the rock 
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landscaping or otherwise disturb the rocks in such a manner that rocks end up on the 
sidewalk. Also, while it might be "foreseeable" that rocks might end up on the sidewalk, 
this is not the foreseeable result of an expected act. On such occasions that rocks did end 
up on the sidewalk, they are comparable to spilled ice cream, or produce that has fallen to 
the floor by the unexpected act of a third party. 
B. ZZXYZ's Rock Landscaping Is Not a Permanent Structure That Would 
Cause Temporary Hazards, 
The Hones appear to rely on the case of Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms, Inc., 538 
P.2d 175,177 (Utah 1975), citing Maugeri v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 357 F.2d 
202 (3rd Cir. 1996), for the proposition that as a temporary condition, rocks on the 
sidewalk can be held to a permanent standard if they are caused by a permanent structure. 
Assuming for the sake of argument that the landscaping qualifies as a structure, the Allen 
case and the Maugeri case seem to indicate that the structure must be dangerous without an 
intervening actor. In Maugeri, the vegetable racks were slanted in such a fashion that 
according to the Court in Allen, "it should have been anticipated that leaves would fall on 
the floor." Id. at 177. Neither the Maugeri or Allen decision make reference to an 
unknown party causing leaves to fall to the floor. Rather, it seems to be assumed that the 
leaves on their own fell to the floor. 
In order for the Maugeri theory to apply to ZZXYZ, the Hones must provide 
evidence that would support the proposition that the design of the landscaping was such that 
the rocks would on their own, or at least without the act of some person, end up on the 
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sidewalk. The Hones have supplied no evidence which would suggest that the rocks in the 
landscaping would be able to move from the landscaping to the sidewalk absent some 
intervening act. The only evidence related to this point is the expert report obtained by 
ZZXYZ which shows that it was not possible for the rain prior to the accident to dislodge 
rocks from the landscaping into the sidewalk. The Hones have not shown any evidence 
which would dispute this finding, or that would in any other way indicate that rocks could be 
transported from the landscaping to the sidewalk, absent intervention by a third party. 
Accordingly, the Hones claim that the landscaping is itself a permanent structure that 
creates temporary hazards is not supported by the evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
Therefore, ZZXYZ respectfully requests that this Court affirm the summary 
judgment granted by the trial court on the grounds that the Hones have failed to provide 
evidence to show that any rocks on the sidewalk at the time of Mr. Hone's fall were the 
cause of Mr. Hone's fall and that further investigation will not reveal the cause of the fall, 
and accordingly, Mr. Hone's claim fails as a matter of law. Alternatively, ZZXYZ 
respectfully requests that this Court affirm the granting of summary judgment on the other 
ground that Mr. Hone has failed to identify a theory of breach of duty which is supported by 
the evidence provided. 
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ADDENDUM 
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(l 1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, an addendum in included 
herewith. 
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* * * 
PROVO, UTAH - OCTOBER 29,2002 
HONORABLE STEVEN L. HANSEN, JUDGE PRESIDING 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Once again on the Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: That's correct, Your Honor. Scott 
Christensen appearing on behalf of defendant. It's our motion. 
THE COURT: We continued this so there would be an 
additional discovery issue on that because of the rain water 
and whether or not it could wash the rocks down on the sidewalk 
and whether it was caused by a third party, right? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: That's the way I understood it, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And you supplied an expert report that 
seems to present an undisputed fact that that couldn't have 
happened, right? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: That's my understanding. 
THE COURT: So I guess we're back to Mr. Jeffs and do 
you have any facts to dispute that as that theory of the case 
is whether or not at least that should be partially ruled upon 
as a matter of law that that could not have been caused by a 
third party or the rain or, I guess what I'm trying to say is 
the design of the landscape. Do you have any evidence to 
dispute that theory? 
MR. JEFFS: That was one possible means by which it 
could have caused it. 
THE COURT: I'm just trying to get to the issue here. 
We've argued this at least twice I think, haven't we? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: This is the second time. 
THE COURT: The second time. And I don't mean to 
disrupt any of your arguments if you'd like to present your 
case a different way, that's fine but that seems to be issue, 
one issue. 
MR. JEFFS: My point is that counsel is presenting 
this argument to the wrong forum. He should be presenting it 
to the trier of the fact and I think if it was presented to the 
trier of the fact, the trier of the fact could conclude that 
the rain was not the cause. That doesn't mean that that ends 
the case as I've indicated in my memorandum in opposition to 
his supplemental memorandum. That is one possibility, but the 
inferences that can be draw -
THE COURT: Let's assume we had a trial and this is 
the evidence, and at the end of the plaintiff's case, your 
case, Mr. Christensen, stands up and asks for a Motion to 
Dismiss and claims that the jury shouldn't be able to speculate 
because the facts that have been presented at this time, are 
undisputed, that there's no evidence contrary to what he's 
presented other than what you presented to show — 
MR. JEFFS: On the issue of rain. 
THE COURT: -on the issue of rain. How would I rule 
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at this point? 
MR. JEFFS: But the issues of whether or not they're 
negligent is still before the jury. The Court could not grant 
a directed verdict, could not grant a motion to dismiss at the 
end of the plaintiff's case because the evidence that would be 
presented as set out in both the affidavits for both 
memorandums is that the manager admitted that he had the 
responsibility to check the walkways to see if they were clear, 
he did not do so. It's undisputed that there were rocks on 
there. They have a responsibility to maintain that area and 
they did not do so and we have seen that since that time, 
numerous times when the rocks have been allowed to be on there 
that caused the fall. That's undisputed. They don't have any 
evidence to dispute that. All they have is they're trying to 
present to the Court that this is the only basis on which the 
jury could draw an inference of negligence from the conduct of 
the parties and that's a factual thing. That's for a jury 
determination, what's those inferences would be drawn. They're 
negligent in maintaining the area and that was the cause of the 
fall of Neil Hone and it isn't merely saying that it wasn't 
caused by rain and we've got an expert that says the rain 
couldn't have done and we've got an engineer that says it 
wouldn't have washed it down there. The jury doesn't have to 
believe the expert once he's subjected to cross examination in 
the context of a trial. 
THE COURT: Let's put this in a different context. 
Let's assume this is a banana peel slip and fall case at 
Smith's. 
MR. JEFFS: But that's a different theory because 
that's saying that the banana was put there by a person other 
than the responsible parties for the area and that was the 
first time that they claimed that our theory was that somebody 
else had put the rocks on there and I said that isn't our 
theory, never has been our theory. Our theory is they have a 
responsibility for maintaining of an area that is their invitee 
area for their people that come in there. They have a 
responsibility and the jury can conclude from the evidence that 
the plaintiffs shall put on in their case, they can conclude 
that they were negligent in that and that that was the cause of 
the accident, whether or not they disallow their expert or 
disbelieve their expert, whichever side they go. They still 
have to face the issue, the jury has the factual issue of 
whether they were negligent in the maintenance of the area and 
that that was the cause of the accident and that because of 
that, my position is that he just presented it to the wrong 
forum. He's not to presenting it to the trier of the fact. 
He's trying to present it as though there is nothing for the 
trier of the fact and the affidavits of Mr. and Mrs. Hone and 
their son all refute that. 
THE COURT: The law is very clear in this state, you 
1 I cannot speculate on proximate cause. The jury can't speculate 
2 ! and guess. There must be some evidence to present of the 
j 
3 ; negligence of the defendant. 
4 } MR. JEFFS: And their own manager saying my duty was 
I 
5 | to do it. I didn't do it that day. My duty was to check that 
6 ! area and then the rocks are on the area and the testimony is 
I 
7 I unrefuted that those small pebbles were on the area and that 
8 I that caused his fall. From that the jury can conclude there is 
9 | negligence. That's what juries do. 
10 J THE COURT: Well, let's assume that the rocks were on 
11 | the sidewalk and let's assume that the banana peel is in the 
i 
i 
12 ! aisle at the store, all right? Let's assume that it's a 
i 
13 I failure to maintain the premises in both of those situation by 
14 ' not inspecting. You still have to have evidence that the rocks I 
i | 
15 | or the banana peel were the cause of the slip or the injury. j 
I ! 
16 I There must be some evidence rather than I fell down in the | 
j • ' | 
17 | aisle at the store and there was a banana peel there. It must j 
i 
18 | have been the banana peel, therefore, Smith's failed in their 
i 
19 | duty and that was the proximate cause of the accident. It 
20 I seems to me to be no different than that. The rocks on the 
21 j sidewalk. Let's assume they were there. We've got photographs 
22 | and you present evidence. You can't speculate though, can you, 
23 | that the rocks were actually, that they slipped on, Paula Hone 
24 | nor Neil Hone have testified in any of their depositions that 
25 ! they actually saw the rocks and they could have caused the slip 
and that they were the reason they slipped, did they? 
MR. JEFFS: He testified that he felt something under 
his feet and they went out from under him. He didn't see it 
and she didn't see the rocks but that means the jury has to 
draw an inference whether that was the cause or not the cause. 
That's not speculation. That's an inference from the evidence 
that is presented and that's what juries do is draw inferences 
from the fact. I see that the banana peel has an entirely 
different life because originally they thought my theory was 
that somebody else put the rocks on the sidewalk and therefore 
their case law says that you have to show that it had been 
there time enough for them to correct it, etc.f etc. That is 
not our theory at all. Our theory at all is their maintenance 
of the premises is their duty just as much as if the produce 
guy had put the banana on the floor. If they did it 
themselves, it doesn't matter the time whether they became 
aware of it or not because their guy did it. That's what our 
theory is here. Their people had to maintain these premises in 
a safe condition and did not do so and I don't think it's 
speculation at all for a jury to say, "Well, of course they 
didn't go over and say how would they be able to say that this 
is the rocks that went out from under his feet when he slammed 
forward into the building and onto the ground?" They have to 
draw it from an inference of the fact that they were there and 
there's no other explanation for his falling down. 
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THE COURT: Well, I would agree with you if it was a 
simple matter of trying to identify a particular rock but I 
don't believe there's any evidence that the rocks caused the 
fall. 
MR. JEFFS: That's the inference the jury would have 
to draw. What did cause the fall then? Did he just fall 
because he fell as they were walking and he was at the side of 
his wife? If they draw that inference, then they no cause us, 
that's true. That's what juries do. They have to decide 
whether the evidence leads them to the inference that it was 
the pebbles on the walkway that caused the fall. Mrs. Hones 
says that while he was done there and they were waiting for the 
ambulance to arrive that she kicked them off there so somebody 
else wouldn't fall of them. The jury can draw that inference 
that that's exactly what caused it, that fall and that's why 
she kicked them off the walkway so that somebody else wouldn't 
fall. 
THE COURT: Well, if those are the facts then we get 
to the issue of whether or not they failed to maintain the 
premises. 
MR. JEFFS: Right, and my point is this, that 
regardless of what he has presented in his memorandum to 
! 
summary judgment, he is asking the Court to make a decision in j 
i 
the way (inaudible) specifically what the Supreme Court has on | 
numerous occasions said the Court can't do. It has to leave I 
that to a jury in a negligence case. 
THE COURT: I'm not sure he's making that argument. 
He's asking to look and see if there's facts sufficient to send 
it to the jury. He's claiming there are no facts. There is no 
evidence that the rocks were the cause of the incident and they 
weren't put there by the negligent design of the landscaping. 
MR. JEFFS: And my position is that the affidavit of 
Neil Hone, the affidavit of -
THE COURT: I looked at those affidavits yesterday 
again. 
MR. JEFFS: - Paula Hone and the affidavit of their 
son, creates that fact situation that precludes summary 
judgment. 
THE COURT: Okay. Neil Hone's affidavit, let's look 
at that. I'm looking at Mr. Christensen's first memorandum. 
MR. JEFFS: The first one? 
THE COURT: Where he cites to the record, Page 2, 
Paragraph 5, Neil did notice some pea gravel on the sidewalk on 
the south side of the building but did not have any trouble 
walking through that area, Page 12, Line 7 through 11 of his 
deposition. After Neil has turned to enter the restaurant he 
took a step or two and fell. Paragraph 8, Neil does not know 
what caused him to fall. Paragraph 9, Neil did not see 
anything on the sidewalk that would have caused him to fall. 
Deposition, Page 34, Line 14 through 17, "While Neil did some 
8 
pea gravel on the sidewalk, on the south side of the building, 
he did not see anything on the sidewalk on the west side of the 
building near the entrance." And then none of the other 
witnesses have ever testified they ever saw anything on the 
sidewalk or what caused the fall. 
And where is Paula's deposition? Paula, Paragraph 
20, did not notice the very small rocks until after he had 
fallen. Page 16, Line 7 through 8. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Those depositions are attached to 
that memorandum too if you need to look at the exact— 
THE COURT: I know. I guess the problem I'm having 
is sending this to a jury and then having them speculate or 
guess or infer that it must have been the rocks. It seems to 
me and I keep coming back to the banana peel, if you slip and 
fall in a grocery store and there's a banana peel there on the 
aisle, you've each got to testify you slipped on the banana 
peel or somebody saw me slip on the banana peel or the banana 
peel caused the fall but if you slip and fall and then there's 
a banana peel there, that doesn't - because they negligently 
failed to maintain the store and didn't wipe up the banana 
peel, that's only one element, that's only one prong of a 
negligence case. You've still got to have evidence that it 
proximately caused the fall. The only reason it's a banana 
peel is it's easy to conceptually visualize but rocks are no 
different. It may be that they negligently maintained the 
premisses and it may be that they negligently failed to sweep 
up the rocks but did the rocks cause the fall? That's the 
problem I'm having with the case. Maybe I'm off base. Maybe 
I'm kicking a dead dog here. 
MR. JEFFS: My concern with that, Your Honor, is that 
when you get to the issue of proximate cause, I know of no 
decisions of the Supreme Court where they said a court could 
decide proximate cause on a summary judgment motion. That is a 
jury decision. 
THE COURT: Oh, I don't think so. I think there's 
case law to that effect. You cannot send the issue — 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Proximate cause is exactly an 
element that must be — 
THE COURT: You cannot speculate on proximate cause. 
MR. JEFFS: And I don't think they have to speculate 
but I think they can draw the inferences from the evidence as 
it presented by the witnesses and based on those inferences, 
they make the decision whether it was proximate cause in every j 
case. I 
THE COURT: Mr. Christensen, what would you like to j 
say? j 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Well, Your Honor-
THE COURT: I'm trying to get to the issues here and 
I don't mean to dismiss any of your arguments. J 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: I understand that and I guess my i 
i 
! 
1 0 i 
1 i biggest concern is is that at the first motion and again here 
2 today, Counsel for the Hones has repeatedly indicated that they 
3 | are not asserting that these rocks were placed there by third 
4 parties. Then the only other option available as I understand 
5 j it under Utah law, is that those rocks were there because it 
6 j was a dangerous condition created by the property owner so that 
7 i we - and their first theory, in fact what they were saying as I 
8 | understand the first one was that they said, No, we're not 
9 | claiming that these rocks were placed there by some third 
10 i party. We're saying that there was a design defect in the 
11 ! landscape features of this that allowed these rocks to be 
12 I washed upon the sidewalk in the area where this happened by the 
13 j weather conditions that existed at the time of the accident. 
14 | So, in either theory — 
15 j THE COURT: That's your theory, isn't it, Mr. Jeffs? 
16 | MR. CHRISTENSEN: That's what he presented to us. 
17 j THE COURT: Why is this difficult for me to 
i 
18 I understand? 
i 
I 
19 i MR. CHRISTENSEN: Then I don't get it because those 
20 j rocks didn't appear there magically, they didn't grow there. 
21 | There has to be some mechanism why those rocks were there on 
22 | the sidewalk. 
23 | THE COURT: It's not like a banana peel case where 
j 
24 | somebody drops the banana peel. Rocks were washed there, 
25 i right. Is that your theory? 
11 
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MR. CHRISTENSEN: They were either washed there-
THE COURT: Or what? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: That's my problem and the only 
thing he presented was he said no, no, no, that's not my 
theory. My theory is not that some third person, some child 
came there and was playing in the rocks and as he came into the 
restaurant he dropped them, you know. This was the result of, 
if you'll remember he described how the entrance was dug into a 
bench there off on the side of the road. 
THE COURT: Which caused us to continue to the case 
to allow for further discovery. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: That's why I went to the expense of 
getting an engineer there to put it on the compass, to shoot 
the slopes, to evaluate the weather records to say this 
couldn't happen. So that takes us back to the point where 
okay, those rocks were not washed onto there because of the 
design aspects of the landscape, then where did the rocks come 
from? I mean that, to me, that precedes the question of okay, 
should we have seen them, what is— 
THE COURT: We do have evidence, at least evidence to 
go to the jury that Paula Hone and Neil Hone saw the rocks. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: That Paula Hone saw rocks on the 
sidewalk after her husband fell. 
THE COURT: Right. Now that's evidence you have to 
live with and that goes to the jury. 
12 
1 I MR. CHRISTENSEN: Certainly. There's a factual 
2 I dispute about that that the manager that came out and the 
3 I witnesses that come onto the scene immediately afterwards said 
4 I they looked and they didn't see anything. So whether or not 
5 | there were rocks there is certainly a factual dispute. I'm not 
6 I contesting that. What I'm saying is that those rocks didn't 
7 | grow there and if you're using the theory that these rocks were 
8 | placed there by some outside agency then we fit back into that 
9 other argument that says alright, if that's the case, before 
10 I the jury can ever evaluate the conduct of the property owner in 
11 | their maintenance, you have to know how long it was there. In 
12 i other words, if it was there for four days, then certainly it's 
13 i an easy issue for the jury to find. If it was there for five 
14 | minutes then it doesn't matter how poor or how irregular their 
15 | maintenance program was because if it was just there for five 
16 I minutes then that's not a reasonable period of time as a matter 
17 ! of law for them to observe it and remedy it. 
18 | THE COURT: That goes to the issue of whether or not 
19 | it was a dangerous condition that they failed to maintain. 
20 | MR. CHRISTENSEN: That's right. 
21 | THE COURT: That's only one prong of the-
22 | MR. CHRISTENSEN: Exactly. But the point is, is that 
23 j I still can't decipher and maybe it's my own thick headedness 
24 I but I still can't figure out where they're claiming the rocks 
25 ! came from because that's a critical element because if it came 
13 
mmmm 
from the landscape features there on the restaurant, then j 
there's got to be some theory of mechanism, they've got to j 
present some evidence to the jury that said these rocks got j 
from point A to point B in order to allow them to, even under j 
their argument today, for the jury to draw some inference that 
that was the cause of his accident. I 
THE COURT: I'm not quite as troubled by that because | 
it appears to me there are factual - she sees the rocks on the j 
sidewalk. j 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: There's question about that. | 
There's no question about that and I'm happy to deal with that | 
but for them to say — • . j 
j 
THE COURT: How long they've been there is a factual I 
issue that goes to whether or not it was a failure to maintain i 
a safe condition. j 
j 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Right, and my understanding is that i 
if it is a dangerous condition, as I understand the law, if it ! 
i 
is a hazardous condition created by the property owner, then | 
that last element is not a factor. If we created the dangerous 
condition, if in other words we thought ic would be clever to I 
have gravel strewn on the sidewalks simply to add to the ! 
atmosphere of a Mexican restaurant and people slip on the \ 
gravel, absolutely we are clearly at fault if the jury thinks 
that's unreasonable, or if that's an unreasonably dangerous j 
condition. No question about that but in this case, they've 
14 i 
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got to point to something about the condition, about the 
landscape, the sidewalk, the features there that created that 
dangerous condition that put those rocks there for it to be our 
responsibility, so that you don't have to worrying about the 
timing element and my understanding was simply that their 
theory was is that given the layout of the landscaping, that it 
allowed for that gravel to wash onto there. Now I understand 
that. It made perfect sense even though I disagreed with 
whether or not it was factually supported but it made sense 
when Mr. Jeffs presented that argument at the last hearing. 
THE COURT: Isn't the more pointed question, is how 
long the rocks had been there? You alluded -
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Absolutely. I agree with that. 
THE COURT: And isn't that established through 
testimony of employees and maintenance people and those that 
had the responsibility to daily makes rounds and inspect the 
premises? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: And his only comment was is he 
doesn't recall whether he did it or not, not that he didn't do 
! 
i 
it. There's no testimony to that effect but the fact of the | 
matter is, is that the only way that can be placed in any kind ! 
of a context is if you know how long the rocks were there. 
That's my point. 
THE COURT: I don't have any trouble holding the 
plaintiffs to the burden of proof to have to prove or present 
15 
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evidence as to the length of time that the rocks were there. j 
It seems to me their duty is simply to establish whether or not I 
I 
the premises were maintained in a safe condition. j 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Then aren't you asking the jury to I 
speculate the same way as you're concerned about proximate j 
cause to say we don't know how long it was there. If it was j 
there for two minutes, they weren't negligent. If it was there! 
for five hours it was negligent. How's the jury to answer that) 
question? That's their burden of proof. That's clearly their j 
burden of proof under the law because at this point they can't j 
point to anything that would implicate Chevy's as placing thosej 
rocks there, nothing about the physical layout of the store or | 
the restaurant that would allow those rocks to be placed there 
! 
and if you remember, there's this cleavage point in case law in! 
j 
these slip and fall cases. The one set of cases clearly | 
defines when they're placed there from an outside agency. The 
second one is when they are created by the property owner and j 
if they were able to establish that those rocks had in fact j 
I 
washed onto there when it rained, then you're absolutely right, j 
They don't have any burden to prove how long they were there j 
because it doesn't matter how long they were there, the cause j 
of it was our fault. So that's why there's this elimination of; 
any need to show the timing of it. So my biggest concern is j 
i 
I'm not sure what horse they're riding, what theory they're j 
presenting in this case. j 
i 
16: 
1 I Now, Mr. Jeffs has said on two occasions it is the 
2 | fact that they're not claiming it was a third person and I 
3 I think that's clearly because they recognize they cannot meet 
4 j the burden of proof under that theory. There's nothing about 
5 | their rocks that will allow them to establish how long these 
6 j rocks were there so they can't meet their necessary 
i 
7 ! requirements under third party and so they're pointing only to 
8 | it and saying, "Well, then this is a dangerous condition that 
9 was created by you." Well, the dangerous condition is the 
10 rocks. If they could establish that those rocks were there 
11 I because of us, not that we failed to discover it, that gets 
i 
i 
12 | back into the other theory, but those rocks were there because 
i 
13 | of us, our employees placing the rocks there, our landscape 
i 
14 | pushing the rocks there, something about us that created that, 
15 I then you're absolutely right, it's not an issue of timing but 
i i 
! ! 
16 ! the Court and counsel have failed to get, to focus on the point j 
17 j of how did those rocks get there. Once you know that, then you 
18 ! know which theory we can go with and until then, I feel like 
19 I I'm sort adrift in trying to respond to, you know, smoke and j 
! i 
20 I mirrors because if the rocks were there by us, then I've got to 
21 | be able to evaluate that, to be able to discuss it with my 
22 j client, to be able to have someone come take a look at it and 
23 j say, was there something about the property that -
24 | THE COURT: How is the plaintiff suppose to know 
25 ! that? How is an invitee into a restaurant suppose to be able 
17 
to prove how the condition came to be, existed? j 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Well, if it weren't rocks, I mean, j 
the problem with this case is it's rocks. If it were an ice j 
cream cone that had fallen, if it were a banana peel that had ! 
fallen, if it was a lettuce leaf that had fallen, you know - j 
THE COURT: How's the plaintiff suppose to prove 
whether or not it was a store employee that dropped a banana | 
peel or a customer that was eating a banana and threw the peel j 
on the ground? I mean, that's not - j 
i 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: It's not necessary - well, under j 
j 
those circumstances, that's their burden of proof because they j 
want pay. Ultimately that's what we're talking about. They're! 
saying, you were a factor, you caused, you are libel for my j 
damages. Now, nothing unusual in the law about saying then you! 
I 
have to prove every essential element in order for a jury to j 
tell the defendant that they are obligated to give you j 
compensation for your injuries. j 
Now, is it serendipity that he claims to have slipped j 
on rocks rather than an ice cube? Is that my fault? Is the j 
defendant then responsible? I mean, someone has got to prove \ 
where those rocks came from in order for anyone, particularly ; 
the jury to evaluate whether the defendant was negligent. Now, j 
! 
I appreciate the fact that it's very difficult because it's a ! 
rock but those are the facts that they've alleged, the 
defendant has and in fact we don't believe that there were any I 
i 
1 8 I 
rocks but as long as they are taking that responsibility, that i 
position, that it was rocks that fell, then they have to do one j 
or the other. They either have to establish that it was from j 
someone else or that there was something about the physical j 
layout of the property that allowed those rocks to wash there, i 
The particular facts of this case are difficult on the j 
plaintiff and I appreciate that but if you shift that burden to j 
the defendant, it is equally difficult for the defendant and j 
our case law imposes that burden on the plaintiff because they j 
I 
are the ones who are seeking compensation. So — i 
| 
THE COURT: What's your best case that you want me toj 
! 
read to further explain your argument, the difference between j 
i 
whether the condition was caused by the defendant or a third J 
party? i 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Let me take a look at my briefs, j 
Your Honor. I think the case law that we cited in our initial ! 
brief is — j 
THE COURT: Because in preparing for this hearing j 
this morning, my main concern was the speculation issue. j 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: And I thinks that clearly a factor, j 
THE COURT: And I want to go back and look at this j 
difference in whether the condition was caused by the defendant | 
or a third party. I'm not quite sure I understand why that | 
matters. j 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Well, our case law is very clear onj 
1 9 I 
that. 
THE COURT: I know and that's why I want to look at 
the case law. What's your best case? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: May I take just a moment to look 
through there because I think there is a fairly recent case -
THE COURT: That's not published? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: No, it is a published decision. 
It's one of those that I cited but I think my very best case i 
the one that cites to the Court, that says these are the 
theories of recovery. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: And it is a temporary, transient, 
third party, or it's a dangerous condition created by the 
property owner, and then it defines the party's 
responsibilities and the duties depending on which theory is 
being presented. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: And if you'll just give me just a 
moment, I'll— 
THE COURT: Explain to me if you can without looking 
at that case, what are the different responsibilities and 
duties under the different theories? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: They start out by stating in 
reference to the dangerous condition, temporary transient 
condition caused by some third party. They say a property 
owner is not an insurer for the safety of all those that come I 
on it. So in order for the law to impose an obligation on them | 
to compensate people who are injured, it is necessary for them | 
j 
to establish certain elements. One of them is that that j 
dangerous condition, because it is transitory, existed for | 
such a length of time that the property owner had a reasonable j 
opportunity to discover and remedy the situation. j 
THE COURT: Okay. i 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Now, the second condition is if it j 
is a condition created by the property owner and there's a I 
grocery store one where they were stocking shelves and there j 
was crates and boxes in the aisle and someone slipped and fell I 
on that, they said it doesn't matter how long it was there j 
i 
because you put it there. Ultimately, you're responsible for j 
it because you created the dangerous condition. You placed the j 
boxes. You placed the crates on the floor that was an obstacle! 
for the plaintiff and the plaintiff then fell. So we don't I 
! 
care about how long it was there because we know ultimately who I 
did it. Similarly, under the first circumstance, if they had I 
found someone who had thrown the banana peel on the ground, j 
that would be a defendant in the lawsuit. They said you j 
created this dangerous condition. I 
THE COURT: And so Mr. Jeffs has told you twice and J 
I 
this Court that his theory is not that the condition was caused J 
by a third party. So therefore, it's caused by, his theory is i 
21 
it's caused by the defendants and therefore the time, as you 
say, it is not an issue that you created the condition. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: But what has to be proven then -
THE COURT: What has to be proven? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: - is that how did the rocks get 
there and that the cause of those rocks getting there was 
created by us. 
THE COURT: Since there's no evidence to dispute the 
fact that you caused the condition by any length of time having 
the rocks on the property — 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Doesn't matter how long. If we 
placed the rocks there - see, that's the dangerous condition. 
It's not the fact that we did or did not conduct an inspection 
of the property. Again, that makes no difference if we created 
the condition. Does that make sense? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: If we put the rocks there, whether 
or not we ever inspected or some other person that was an 
employee that might have had responsibility to correct our own 
mistake -
THE COURT: Doesn't matter. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: - doesn't matter, but ultimately 
that boils down to not did we inspect but what did we do to 
place those rocks there? Now, my understanding of the first 
argument was the landscape. We've responded to that. Is there 
22 
something else that the plaintiffs can point to that they can 
argue to a jury or to this Court that we are responsible for 
the dangerous conditions, the rocks being placed on the 
sidewalk in the area that the plaintiff alleges to have fallen 
on? 
THE COURT: You spent most of your time this morning 
on this issues which obviously you feel is your best case, your 
best point. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: I understand it's the only issue 
I've got. I mean— 
THE COURT: You still have the proximate cause 
argument. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Certainly, and that was in our 
first motion. I haven't addressed it because I don't think 
they get to that question yet. Proximate case is a secondary 
issue once they can establish that we created the dangerous 
condition. 
THE COURT: Breach of a duty, right. 
Okay. Mr. Jeffs, in conclusion, obviously you can 
tell, both of you can tell I'm struggling with this case and 
I've looked at it a couple of times. 
MR. JEFFS: Mr. Christensen keeps wanting to 
formulate my theories for me but I won't allow him to do that. 
We have never, ever suggested that a third person put those 
rocks there. That theory, that first theory that he's just 
23 
discussed with you has never been part of this case. The j 
conditions that were created by the defendant in this case, if 
you look at the pictures that we attached and the affidavits of j 
Paula Hone, those planted areas right next to where these j 
pebbles were, those planted area have some fairly large rocks | 
in them but interspersed in them are thousands and thousands of I 
the very small rocks on which he fell. j 
THE COURT: Right next to the sidewalk? j 
MR. JEFFS: Right next to the sidewalk, yes, in that I 
planted area right next to where he fell on the sidewalk. Now, j 
i 
! 
counsel would have me the burden of establishing the precise j 
mechanics by which they got there. The creation of the j 
condition has always been that they had rocks there that got on I 
l 
the sidewalk and they didn't take care of them and they still j 
i 
don't care of them to this very day and those rocks, whether j 
they come out by wind blowing them out of there, whether they j 
i 
come out by them hosing down the sidewalk and the planted areas i 
i 
and put them on the sidewalk, we don't have to prove that. We j 
have to prove that there were rocks there on their thing and | 
that the condition was an unsafe condition at the time Neil | 
Hone fell and let the jury draw their inferences because as the j 
j 
Court pointed out, it is an impossible burden to say precisely I 
! 
how this rock was picked up or those group of rocks were picked j 
up and put over on the sidewalk. They were on their sidewalk j 
i 
in an area for invitees and it was an unsafe condition that j 
i 
i 
i J 
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1 J caused the fall and the proximate cause issue is exactly the 
2 | same thing is that the jury has to look at that and say yes, we 
3 J think that's what caused the fall. That's what juries do and 
4 | we think it's a factual issue and it should not be decided on 
5 ! summary judgment. 
! 
6 ! THE COURT: Thank you. 
7 ! Do you have a case? 
8 j MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yes. It's referenced in Page 11 of 
9 I our memorandum. I think it's the Martin v. Safeway Stores, 
10 I Inc. 
11 j THE COURT: I remember that case. 
12 | MR. CHRISTENSEN: That's the case where I think the 
I | 
13 ! court went to some detail to explain the distinction between 
14 | the two theories of slip and fall. 
15 | Your Honor, there is also another motion that we 
16 ! filed. It's in reference to Paula Hone's claim and that one I 
17 I think is ready to be addressed and the Court can — 
18 ! THE COURT: Go ahead. Do you want to say something 
19 ! about that? 
20 | MR. JEFFS: I thought we addressed that last time? 
21 I THE COURT: That's the emotional -
22 I MR. CHRISTENSEN: I don't recall whether that ever 
23 ! was because we never got to that. 
24 | MR. JEFFS: We stipulated in open court last time. 
25 I MR. CHRISTENSEN: That she was dismissed? 
25 ! 
•H ^ H 
MR. JEFFS: Yes. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Okay, I'm sorry. 
MR. JEFFS: We did that in Court last time. 
THE COURT: You're right on the ball, Mr. Jeffs. I' 
forgotten that as well, thank you. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: That's a loose end on my part and 
if I -
THE COURT: Okay, thank you. I'm going to take a 
third look at this case and I apologize to both of you and the 
frustration you must be experiencing in trying to get a 
decision but it's a complicated issue. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: It is a difficult case and I 
appreciate that but I think the problem is that the rules are 
going to impose an extremely difficult burden on someone, your 
ruling will and I think that the case law has established who 
that burden falls on and we believe it's the plaintiff. 
THE COURT: Thank you. I'll issue a decision 
shortly. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
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